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Abstract
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ects of investment
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1. Introduction
The tendency that stocks with high book-to-market ratios (BM) earn substantially higher
returns than do those with low BMs is one of well-known anomalies in the stock market. It
is called the value eect. In the literature, there exist two competing explanations for this
phenomenon: the risk-based explanation and the mispricing hypothesis. The former argues
that the BM reects the relative distress risk of a rm and the risk of a rm's investment
activities (Fama and French, 2006; Grin and Lemmon, 2002; Zhang, 2005). The latter
states that investors tend to overvalue (undervalue) rms with low (high) BMs, which results
in mean-reverting in the subsequent periods (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994).
In this paper, we examine whether the value eect is due to systematic risks or whether it
occurs because of behavioral reasons. First, we test whether the value eect disappears after
eliminating the eects of systematic risks on the BM. After estimating residuals (RedBM) by
regressing BMs on proxies for nancial distress and investment activities (i.e., asset growth,
investment to asset, new stock issue), we form quintile portfolios according to RedBM and
evaluate monthly return spreads between the highest RedBM portfolio and the lowest RedBM
portfolio (RedBM hedging portfolio). We nd that the RedBM hedging portfolio yields
positive returns with statistical signicance. The return is not dierent from that of the BM
hedging portfolio. Our results indicate that the relative distress risk of a rm and the risk
of the rm's investment activities do not seem to be a main driver of the value eect, which
means that the value eect is due to mispricing.
Second, we test whether the value eect is driven by misevaluation by investors. To test
this prediction, we examine the eect of limit-to-arbitrage on the value eect. As suggested
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by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), when arbitrages are costly, risky, and limited, there is a
possibility that mispricing may not be corrected quickly. By employing two proxies for limit-
to-arbitrage, we form 15 portfolios with RedBM and each limit-to-arbitrage proxy. Following
Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003), we use idiosyncratic volatility and investor sophistication
as proxies for limit-to-arbitrage. Then, we evaluate the monthly return spreads between
the highest RedBM portfolio and the lowest RedBM portfolio on the subsample splits by
using a given limit-to-arbitrage proxy. We nd that the returns of RedBM hedging portfolios
take larger values among the subsamples that have higher idiosyncratic volatility and lower
investor sophistication. The results lend support for the prediction that the value eect is
due to mispricing.
Our ndings contribute to the literature on the value eect, in which it is still controversial
whether the value eect is driven by systematic risks or mispricing. Xing (2008) nds that the
value eect disappears after controlling for investment factors, which is consistent with the
q-theory suggested by Zhang (2005). However, Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003) nd that
the value eect is stronger among stocks with higher idiosyncratic risk, higher transaction
costs, and lower analyst following, which is consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1997). We
provide robust evidence supporting the mispricing hypothesis by using residual BMs that
are not aected by systematic risks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
primary data and calculates the book-to-market equity residuals used in our tests. Section
3 describes the results of comprehensive analysis whether the value eect is due to risk or
mispricing. Section 4 presents the conclusion of this study.
3
2. Data
2.1. Primary data
Our sample consists of rms listed in the rst section of the stock exchanges in Japan
from the period of 1980 to 2010, based on market and nancial data available from the
Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System. We exclude nancial institutions and rms
with negative book values. We also winsorize rms with highest and lowest 0.5% of BMs to
alleviate the eect of outliers. Under these data requirements, the number of rms in our
sample ranges from 846 rms in 1980 to 1,523 rms in 2010, with an average of 1,195 rms
per year.
2.2. Denition of variables
We dene variables used in our tests as follows. BM is dened as the ratio of book value of
equity to market value of equity (MCAP). We employ asset growth (AG), investment to asset
(IA), and net stock issue (NSI) as proxies for the systematic risk of investment activities.
Following Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008), we measure AG as the change in total assets.
Following Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang (2008), IA is measured as the change in gross property,
plant, and equipment (PPE) plus the change in inventories.1 To standardize AG and IA,
both values are divided by the total assets at the previous scal year end. Following Li
and Zhang (2010), net stock issue (NSI) is dened as the natural log of the ratio of the
shares outstanding divided by the shares outstanding at the end of the previous scal year.
Variables from nancial data are used as of the most recent scal year end. The variables
1Gross PPE are calculated as the sum of the net PPE plus depreciation plus impairment loss. Because
the impairment loss on the Nikkei NEEDS database includes both impairment loss on PPE and intangibles,
we allocate the impairment loss for PPE in proportion to the amount of net PPE divided by the sum of net
PPE plus intangibles.
4
are revised a month after the release of nancial statements. We also employ a proxy for
nancial distress. We calculate probability of nancial distress (Pnaive) following Bharath
and Shumway (2008).
Panel A of Table 1 presents time-series averages of the mean, standard deviation, mini-
mum, and maximum of rm characteristics. The mean of BM is 0.699, which indicates that,
on average, the rm's market value exceeds its book value. The mean of AG is 0.044, with
a standard deviation of 0.110; the mean of IA is 0.039, with a standard deviation of 0.073;
and the mean of NSI is 0.015, with a standard deviation of 0.043. These values indicate that
there are signicant variations in investment-related variables both across rms and over
time.
2.3. Residual book-to-market ratios (RedBMs)
To calculate RedBMs, we regress BM on AG, IA, NSI, Pnaive, and the natural logarithm
of MCAP (LnMCAP) and obtain residuals. Panel B of Table 1 reports the results of time-
series average of annual regressions (Fama-MacBeth regression results). The t-statistics are
adjusted using Newey and West's (1987) robust standard errors with a one-month lag. Panel
B shows the multiple regression result with all risk-related variables. As shown in Panel B,
the slope coecients of AG and NSI are negative (-0.313 and -1.018) and are statistically
signicant (t =  10:03 and  16:36). However, the slope coecient of IA is slightly positive
(0.041) and is not statistically signicant (t = 1:24). This result indicates that the slope
coecient of IA is subsumed. Panel B also shows that the slope coecient of Pnaive is
positive (0.392), with a t-statistic of 2.81, and that the slope coecient of LnMCAP is
negative (-0.095), with a t-statistic of -14.66. Overall, the above results imply that risks of
investment activities and nancial distress aect BM.
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3. Empirical results
3.1. Portfolios sorted by BM and RedBM
In this section, by using RedBM predicted in formula Panel B of Table 1, we evaluate
the value eect after controlling for the eect of systematic risks on BM. For each month, we
form quintile portfolios with the latest RedBM and construct a hedging portfolio that longs
the highest RedBM portfolio and shorts the lowest RedBM portfolio. Then, we calculate
time series average of monthly equal- and value-weighted returns of quintile and hedging
portfolios. We also estimate alphas by regressing the monthly excess returns on Fama and
French (1993) three-factors plus a momentum factor (Carhart, 1997).2 Table 2 reports the
results of alphas. After controlling for four factors, the equal-weighted alpha is 0.51% and
statistically signicant (t =  4:51); the value-weighted alpha is 0.51% and is statistically
signicant (t = 4:52). These results show that the mispricing is still a strong driver of the
value eect, even after controlling for traditional factors.
3.2. Portfolios sorted by BM/RedBM and proxies for limit-to-arbitrage
The mispricing hypothesis suggests that the value eect reects mispricing due to the
market participant's behavioral biases. If mispricing is a main driver of the value eect, the
value eect is expected to be stronger among rms with a stricter limit-to-arbitrage. To test
this prediction, we employ two proxies for limit-to-arbitrage. The rst one is idiosyncratic
volatility (IVOL). Because arbitrageurs are poorly diversied, idiosyncratic risk adds sub-
stantially to the total risk of their portfolios. Therefore, arbitrageurs tend to avoid investing
in rms with high IVOL, which leads to diculty in hedging (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
2These factors are calculated using the Japanese market data following the description in the Kenneth
R. French Data Library Web site.
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Following Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003), IVOL is dened as the standard deviation of
the residuals obtained from regressions of excess returns of individual stocks over the past
36 months on the 4-factor, Fama-French three factors and a momentum factor. The sec-
ond proxy is foreign investors ownership (FORGN), which is dened as the percentage of
outstanding shares held by foreign investors. According to Hamao and Mei (2001), foreign
investors have more sophisticated investment technology than do their domestic investors in
Japan.
Using proxies for the degree of limit-to-arbitrage, we examine the return predictability
of RedBM. First, we divide all stocks into three groups according to each proxy for limit-
to-arbitrage. We employ the top three and bottom three deciles based on each proxy for
limit-to-arbitrage as breakpoints. Then, we form quintile portfolios with the latest RedBM
and construct a hedging portfolio. Table 3 reports four-factor model-adjusted alphas of the
portfolios in each subsample with t-statistics using Newey and West's (1987) robust standard
errors.
Panel A of Table 3 shows that when we employ equal-weighted portfolios, the RedBM
hedging portfolio with high IVOL yields larger returns than does a portfolio with a low
IVOL. The spread between the RedBM hedging portfolio with a high IVOL and that with a
low IVOL is 0.48%, and this dierence is statistically signicant (t = 2:83). Panel B of Table
3 presents, when we employ equal-weighted portfolios, the RedBM hedging portfolio with
low FORGN yields larger returns than does that with high FORGN. The spread between
high FORGN and low FORGN is -1.07% and is statistically signicant (t =  5:36).3 The
3In the case of both proxies, when we employ value-weighted portfolios, we obtain similar empirical
results.
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above ndings indicate that the degree of limit-to-arbitrage aects the magnitude of the
value eect, which means that mispricing is a strong driver of the value eect.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we show that the eect of mispricing on the value eect persists, even after
we control for the eect of risks such as investment factors and nancial distress. Using
BMs free of investment factors and nancial distress (RedBM), we nd that RedBM can
predict future price appreciations. We also nd that the tendency is stronger among stocks
with higher degrees of limit-to-arbitrage. Our ndings provide supportive evidence for the
hypothesis that the behavioral biases of investors drive the value eect. We contribute to
the literature on the value eect in that we provide more robust empirical evidence than do
Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003). We obtain similar results to Ali, Hwang, and Trombley
(2003), even after eliminating the eect of investment factors and distress risks.
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Table 1: Summary statistics of rm characteristics. Panel A reports descriptive statistics of rma characteristics and Fama-MacBeth (annually)
regression results of book-to-market ratios on rm characteristics from 1980 to 2010. BM is dened as the ratio of book value of equity to market
value of equity (MCAP). Asset growth (AG) is the change in total assets. Investment-to-asset (IA) is measured as the change in gross property, plant,
and equipment (PPE) plus the change in inventories. Net stock issue (NSI) is dened as the natural log of the ratio of the shares outstanding divided
by the shares outstanding at the previous scal year. Probability of nancial distress (Pnaive) is calculated following Bharath and Shumway (2008).
Panel B reports time-series average of regressions of BM on AG, IA, NSI, Pnaive, and MCAP. t-statistics are adjusted for the Newey and West (1987)
robust standard errors with one year lag.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of rm characteristics
BM AG IA NSI Pnaive MCAP (106)
Mean 0.699 0.044 0.039 0.015 0.041 211,411
SD 0.378 0.110 0.073 0.043 0.102 639,804
Min 0.045 -0.281 -0.229 -0.027 0.000 4,855
Max 2.555 0.657 0.457 0.355 0.780 14,120,658
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression of BM on rm characteristics
Intercept AG IA NSI Pnaive MCAP
coef. 1.649 -0.225 -0.004 -0.980 0.443 -0.089
t-stat. 5.43 -3.06 -0.04 -5.78 3.05 -4.28
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Table 2: Alphas of BM/RedBM quintile and hedging portfolios. This table reports the 4-factor model (Fama and French three-factors plus momentum
factor) adjusted alphas of BM/RedBM quintile and hedging portfolios. For each month, we construct a hedging portfolio that has a long position in
the highest BM/RedBM portfolio and a short position in the lowest BM/RedBM portfolio, using the latest BM/RedBM. This table report equal- and
value-weighted returns of portfolios with t-statistics, which are adjusted using Newey and West (1987) robust standard errors with one month lag.
Sorting by EW/VW 1 (low) 2 3 4 5 (high) 5{1 t(5-1)
BM EW -0.205% -0.200% -0.094% -0.120% 0.046% 0.251% 2.53
BM VW -0.168% -0.191% -0.094% -0.126% 0.044% 0.212% 2.12
RedBM EW -0.449% -0.135% -0.096% 0.050% 0.059% 0.508% 4.51
RedBM VW -0.444% -0.130% -0.087% 0.057% 0.062% 0.506% 4.52
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Table 3: Alphas of hedging portfolio sorted by RedBM in subsamples sorted by proxies for limit-to-arbitrage. This table reports 4-factor model
adjusted alphas of quintile and hedging portfolio sorted by RedBM on subsamples that were rst sorted by proxies for limit-to-arbitrage: Idiosyncratic
volatility (IVOL) and foreign investor ownership (FORGN). IVOL is dened as the standard deviation of residuals estimated by regressing e individual
returns on Fama and French three-factors plus momentum factor over the past 36 months. FORGN is dened as the percentage of outstanding shares
held by foreign investors at the previous scal year end. First, all stocks are divided into three groups according to each proxy for limit-to-arbitrage.
The top three and bottom three deciles based on each proxy for limit-to-arbitrage are employed as breakpoints. Then, in each subsample, quintile and
hedging portfolios are constructed using the latest RedBM. Panels A and B report the results when IVOL is employed as a proxy for limit-to-arbitrage.
Panels C and D report the results when FORGN is employed as a proxy for limit-to-arbitrage. t-statistics are adjusted using Newey and West (1987)
robust standard errors with one month lag.
Panel A: Equal-weighted returns of portfolio sorted by RedBM in subsamples sorted by IVOL
1(low RedBM) 2 3 4 5(high RedBM) 5{1 t(5-1)
1(low IVOL) -0.091% -0.050% 0.080% 0.142% 0.191% 0.282% 2.36
2 -0.181% -0.040% -0.104% 0.070% 0.100% 0.281% 2.29
3(high IVOL) -0.914% -0.378% -0.255% -0.270% -0.154% 0.760% 4.74
3(high)-1(low) 0.477% 2.83
Panel B: Value-weighted returns of portfolio sorted by RedBM in subsamples sorted by IVOL
1(low RedBM) 2 3 4 5(high RedBM) 5{1 t(5-1)
1(low IVOL) -0.091% -0.056% 0.086% 0.150% 0.199% 0.290% 2.40
2 -0.190% -0.054% -0.099% 0.062% 0.085% 0.275% 2.25
3(high IVOL) -0.928% -0.371% -0.223% -0.247% -0.152% 0.776% 4.84
3(high)-1(low) 0.486% 2.92
Panel C: Equal-weighted returns of portfolio sorted by RedBM in subsamples sorted by FORGN
1(low RedBM) 2 3 4 5(high RedBM) 5{1 t(5-1)
1(low FORGN) -0.888% -0.253% -0.208% 0.008% 0.227% 1.116% 6.59
2 -0.237% -0.245% -0.085% -0.118% 0.021% 0.259% 2.03
3(high FORGN) -0.029% -0.031% 0.100% 0.060% 0.015% 0.044% 0.31
3(high)-1(low) -1.071% -5.36
Panel D: Value-weighted returns of portfolio sorted by RedBM in subsamples sorted by FORGN
1(low RedBM) 2 3 4 5(high RedBM) 5{1 t(5-1)
1(low FORGN) -0.924% -0.266% -0.214% -0.001% 0.226% 1.149% 6.86
2 -0.247% -0.255% -0.083% -0.106% 0.023% 0.270% 2.12
3(high FORGN) -0.012% -0.023% 0.116% 0.070% 0.026% 0.038% 0.26
3(high)-1(low) -1.111% -5.54
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